

## Identifies Period 8: 1945-1980

AMSCO Ch 26, Ch 27, Ch28, [American Yawp](#) Chapter 25, 26, 27

1. Origins of the Cold War
2. *The Long Telegram (excerpt)*
3. Containment in Europe: Truman Doctrine
4. Containment in Europe: Marshall Plan
5. Containment in Europe: The Berlin Airlift
6. NATO and National Security: NATO, Warsaw Pact; National Security Act; arms race
7. Cold War in Asia: The Korean War
8. The Second Red Scare: House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC)
9. *It's Okay...We're Hunting Communists*
10. The Second Red Scare: Espionage Cases: Hiss Case; Rosenberg case
11. The Rise of Joseph McCarthy
12. Dulles Diplomacy: Brinkmanship; Massive retaliation
13. Covert action
14. Division of Vietnam: Domino theory
15. U.S.-Soviet Relations: Sputnik shock; U-2 incident
16. Military-industrial complex
17. *Why We Are in Vietnam*
18. Foreign Affairs: Bay of Pigs; Cuban Missile Crisis
19. Foreign Affairs: Berlin Wall
20. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution Escalating the War
21. Controversy: Hawks versus Doves; Tet offensive

## Primary Sources

**The Long Telegram, George Kennan, 1946**

Source: George Kennan, State Department official, September 1946

I don't think that we can influence them [the Soviets] by reasoning with them, by arguing with them, by going to them and saying, "Look here, this is the way things are." I don't believe that is possible. . . . If we can keep them maneuvered into a position where it is always hard and unprofitable for them to take action contrary to the principles of the United Nations and to our policies and where there is always an open door and an easy road to collaboration . . . I personally am quite convinced that . . . sooner or later the logic of it will penetrate their government and will force changes there.

“It’s Okay – We’re Hunting Communists”, Herbert Block, 1947



**Excerpt from *Why We Are in Vietnam*, Lyndon Johnson, 1965**

Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Vietnam? We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Vietnam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence. And I intend to keep our promise.

To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemy, and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.

We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being rests, in part, on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of American commitment, the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.

We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Vietnam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must say in Southeast Asia, as we did in Europe, in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further."